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Evaluating atypical imagination and cognition in autism: working in the arts science 
interspace 
 
Ilona Roth 
 
Hans Asperger, writing in 1944, and later translated by Uta Frith observed that ‘Autistic 
children are able to produce original ideas. Indeed they can only be original, and mechanical 
learning is hard for them…..the special abilities and disabilities of autistic people are 
interwoven.’1 Yet in 1991 Frith wrote: ‘The appearance of rapt attention and deep absorption 
in their own preoccupations may be partly responsible for the belief that autistic children 
have a rich inner imagination. However, there is little evidence to suggest that autistic 
children have the same sort of fantasy life as normally developing children’.2 Asperger’s 
reputation as an autism pioneer has foundered, justifiably, following the shocking revelations 
of his role in Nazi euthanasia programmes3 Quoting him here is in no way to endorse the 
man, but rather to highlight some of the strikingly different interpretations of the autistic 
imagination that form the backdrop to this chapter. 
 
  In examining research into those constraints on imagination typically considered 
characteristic of autism, I draw upon my experience as a psychologist specialising in the 
autism field, as well as my educational film work as an Open University (OU) academic. My 
long-standing personal interest in the arts and humanities began to infuse my work on autism 
in the early 2000s, when I conducted studies of poetry written by writers on the autism 
spectrum.4 I consolidated my arts base with an honours degree in humanities and Romance 
languages, completed in 2017. In a recent paper, I offer a poetic response to visual artworks 
by autistic artists.5 My ongoing quest for the rapprochement of science and arts forms a 
backdrop to this chapter, as does my engagement with the evolving culture of autism research 
over a number of decades.        
In what follows I employ a first person perspective rather than traditional scientific 
narrative, to revisit video footage in which, over more than 25 years, I have sought to portray 
key findings about autism. Drawing upon five vignettes or ‘scenes’, I explore 
epistemological, interpretive and ethical issues highlighted by working in a space where 
scientific method is juxtaposed with the richer more individualistic interpretations that the 
video medium promotes. In the first three scenes, scientific tests of imaginative capacities are 
put under the spotlight, and reconsidered in terms of questions and insights suggested by the 
footage. In the fourth scene, I interview a young autistic man, who offers ‘inside’ insights 
into his own skills and difficulties with social and individual imagination. In the fifth, I 
consider the life story and work of an artistically gifted autistic child.   
 
Autism, Case Studies and Psychological Science 
The first descriptions of autism, by child psychiatrist Leo Kanner6 and paediatrician Hans 
Asperger, took the form of case studies, that is, detailed observations of characteristics and 
behaviour, together with developmental history, of individual children in their clinical care.  
Asperger, notably, described some of his young child patients as having clever if eccentric 
ideas and interests- what by today’s standards would surely count as imagination, albeit of an 
unusual kind. Yet both clinicians also described the narrow, restricted focus and adherence to 
repetitive behaviours and routines, which have been accepted as a hallmark of autism ever 
since. In DSM-5, the latest version of one of two internationally used diagnostic systems,7 
this symptom cluster forms one of two main diagnostic criteria, along with problems in social 
interaction and communication.   
Case studies provide a wonderfully rich mine of information, but they are of their 
nature selective, reflecting what the author considers most significant, especially in 
establishing a new diagnostic profile, or matching observations to an existing one. Alongside 
the 1960s paradigm shift to cognitive psychology, which promoted experimental studies of 
the human mind, it was inevitable and important that the behaviour of autistic children would 
be more systematically explored.  
Science also helped to challenge ill-founded theories and spurious claims of an autism 
‘cure’. For instance, Bruno Bettelheim’s corrosive and stigmatising theory that autism was 
caused by emotionally cool and detached mothering was countered, in part, by convincing 
scientific evidence for genetic influences in autism.8 Psychological and neuroscientific work 
has continued to play a key role in presenting a reliable and authoritative picture of autism.  
Autism and imagination 
Theories about how autistic people think evolved in the 1980s, with the experimental work of 
Simon Baron-Cohen and Uta Frith among others. Yet insights into imagination in autism 
remained fragmentary. Restricted and repetitive behaviours and interests (RRBIs), long 
recognized as diagnostic, implied that autistic individuals, with their strong dependence on 
structure, sameness and routine, would struggle to generate novel and original ideas, and thus 
lack creativity. Kanner and Asperger had noted that their case study children showed little 
pretend play. For instance, instead of using a brick as a toy car, or a stick as a gun, they 
preferred to line up their toys, or sort them by colour or shape. Baron-Cohen reported 
concordant experimental findings, although diminished pretend play may be motivational 
rather than a fundamental ‘deficit’.9   
Paradoxically, a small minority of children on the autism spectrum show exceptional 
talents in fields typically associated with creativity, including visual art and music.10 The fact 
that these gifts are frequently attributed to exceptional memory and attention to detail, 
conveniently side-steps any challenge they otherwise pose for the diagnostic criterion of 
imagination-related difficulties. I argue for a more complex and nuanced account of creativity 
which better accommodates this work. 
Underlying the absence of a coherent picture of imaginative capacity in autism, lies a 
wider lack of theoretical consensus about imagination and its relationship to creativity, which 
has been addressed elsewhere.11 For present purposes I will adopt a broad definition of 
imagination, as encompassing both social imagination, the capacity to imagine what other 
people are thinking and feeling, considered fundamental for reciprocal social interactions, 
and individual creativity, the capacity to generate novel, original ideas and outputs.   
The autistic imagination in film: revisiting an archive 
As an OU academic, I have had opportunities to devise and present audio-visual resources for 
undergraduate distance teaching courses. In my earlier ventures, some doubling as BBC 
general service broadcasts, my aim was to demonstrate the methodology and theoretical 
implications of experimental and other scientific work on autism and imagination. This aim 
characterized the first three of the five scenes discussed here.  
My purpose now is not to question the important contribution of the scientific 
methodology and findings illustrated here. Yet in revisiting the footage with a more visual 
focus, I have observed nuances and considered issues that the experimental tasks were not 
designed to capture. I see cues from the children which might usefully have been pursued, 
and even missed opportunities to scaffold their responses to the tasks, but for the 
experimental design, and protocol which constrains an experimenter to adopt a consistent, 
neutral stance towards all participants. I have found myself questioning this studied 
neutrality, and its epistemological and ethical consequences. In the two final scenes, 
interviews recorded in 2017, I adopt a different lens. 
 
Scene One: The Sybil Elgar School, London 1989 
I am with an OU/BBC production unit, filming for an undergraduate psychology course.12 
The Sybil Elgar School has a special place in autism history. It was the first school for 
autistic children established in the 1960s by the National Autistic Society, at that time a 
pioneering group of parents seeking better services and support for their children with the 
then little known autism diagnosis. These parents have fulsome praise for all that Sybil Elgar, 
the charismatic head – teacher, achieved with their children.13 
Our filming starts in the school playground. The broadcast commentary highlights 
that the children tend to play alone, and explains that they have ‘a condition known as 
autism’. I recall that the producer insisted on a male commentary ‘to suit the subject matter’. 
The rather portentous tones of my colleague, once an actor, bother me to this day.  
We film inside the school too, children in their classrooms, artwork on the walls and a 
poignant interview with two parents describing their feelings on learning that their child was 
autistic. Then we set up to record what is, in its way, a historic sequence of educational film. I 
had invited psychologist Simon Baron-Cohen, then not long out of graduate school, to reprise 
experiments he had published in 1985, which became landmark studies of autism, and 
launched his own distinguished career.14  
In a school classroom, we recreate and record experimental scenarios illustrating the 
step by step sequence through which Simon tested his big idea. Our participants are two 
autistic children- Sara and Andrew, both aged about 11 and pupils at the school, and a 
younger ‘neurotypical control’ child, Gabriel, aged about 4.   
Mirror recognition and self 
Simon first sits next to Sara, holds a mirror in front of them both, and asks Sara to identify 
each person in the mirror. He repeats the test with Andrew. Both children respond, naming 
themselves and Simon correctly. Simon then comments that contrary to a theory prevalent at 
the time, this result shows that autistic children do have some sense of self: ‘At least at the 
lowest level of being able to appreciate that they are physical objects separate to other 
people.’12 Almost 30 years ago, this comment seemed broadly acceptable - a logical 
inference from the results. However, on revisiting the footage, I have found the observation 
dehumanising. While I doubt that Baron-Cohen himself would use such language nowadays, 
here is an example of experimental stance setting the researcher apart from participants in a 
cool relationship of expert interpreting ‘subject matter’. This is not a question of unkindness: 
Simon cares deeply about autistic children, and has devoted his life to studying autism. But 
his communications with the children in this experiment follow a script, and his demeanour, 
though courteous, is detached; almost, one might say, a mirror for the behaviour he is 
studying. 
Yet with a different investigative stance, Simon could have asked Sara and Andrew to 
say more about the self they had recognized in the mirror, perhaps evoking interesting 
insights into the autistic sense of self, and each child’s inner life. Whenever I look at this 
footage, I am struck by Sara’s proud, smiling demeanour. The appearance of depth and 
something enigmatic in her expression suggest an inner life far from Simon’s objectifying 
account. Andrew, by contrast, is a reserved and sad-looking looking child, but here too there 
is surely a story. Perhaps these children could have talked about themselves, and expressed 
their thoughts about the tests. According to the quote from Frith opening this chapter, little 
would come of such an exercise. Yet a number of autistic people, for instance Temple 
Grandin and Daniel Tammett, have written autobiographies documenting rich if unusual 
inner lives.15 
 
Perceptual perspective-taking 
The mock-up laboratory is now re-arranged. A toy telephone is placed on the table in front of 
the child, a toy frog on a table to one side, and a toy elephant to the other side. Simon sits 
opposite the child directing his gaze to each toy in turn and asks Sara and then Andrew what 
he, Simon, is looking at. The children respond correctly each time, from which Simon 
concludes that, in a ‘purely perceptual sense’, these children can take the perspective of 
another person. Visually, they can see the world from another person’s point of view. There 
is no comment on the rather sophisticated visual processing required to work out where 
someone else is looking, to look there too and identify what they are looking at. Rather this 
result is framed as a comparatively unremarkable achievement compared with the challenge 
of the next test. 
The Sally-Anne false belief task 
There is now a final scene change. Simon sits at the table facing Andrew, and plays out a 
scenario with two small dolls, Sally and Anne, and some other props, describing each step as 
he goes. First he introduces and names the dolls and equips each doll with a small coloured 
‘box’ (actually an inverted toy brick), placing a marble inside Sally’s box. He now walks 
Sally ‘out of the room’, saying that she is going out to play. He then walks Anne over to 
Sally’s box, and enacts her removing Sally’s marble, and walking back to her own box to 
hide the marble. He brings Sally back ‘into the room’. He now asks Andrew three seemingly 
simple questions, which form the core of the test: 
Belief question: Where will Sally look for her marble? (Correct response: in Sally’s box) 
Memory question: Where was the marble at the beginning? (Correct response: in Sally’s box) 
Reality question: Where is the marble really? (Correct response: in Anne’s box) 
Insert Figure 4.1 about here with caption: 
The Sally Anne false belief task. Some details differ from the filmed version, but essentials 
remain the same. (Image: The Open University) 
 
Andrew follows the procedure closely with the rather impassive expression he has had 
throughout these recordings. He answers without hesitation, correctly pointing to Sally’s box 
in answer to the memory question, and to Anne’s box in answer to the reality question. But 
his confident response to the belief question is that Sally will look in Anne’s box where the 
marble is now, not in her own box. Now it is Sara’s turn, and as before she approaches the 
task smiling, head held high and, notably, returning Simon’s gaze. But as for Andrew, her 
unhesitating response to the belief question is incorrect: Anne’s box, not Sally’s.  
The last participant is Gabriel, the four-year-old ‘control child’. As Simon explains, if much 
younger controls respond correctly, this rules out that the autistic children’s difficulty with 
the task reflects general intellectual delay. Gabriel answers all three questions correctly and 
grins conspiratorially at Simon when responding to the belief question, as if he knows that 
this is a game in which Anne has cheekily deceived Sally and hidden her marble.  
Why do the two older autistic children fail on the crucial belief question, while the 
younger neurotypical child passes? Simon attributes this to their inability to put themselves in 
another person’s shoes, mentally speaking. Unable to take the mental perspective of another, 
they fail to understand that another person’s belief about a situation may be different from 
their own - and in this case wrong. It is principally from the incorrect answers of children like 
Andrew and Sara in the Sally-Anne task, and performance in similar false-belief tasks, that 
the highly influential idea of a ‘theory of mind deficit’ in autism took off, stimulating a 
veritable industry of further psychological studies and embellishments to the theory over 
subsequent decades. In addition, the finding influenced the linguistic pragmatics approach 
known as Relevance Theory16 and the newly evolving cognitive approaches to literature.   
Claims about theory of mind problems in autism have nonetheless needed increasing 
qualification and revision17 The validity and scope of false belief tasks as tests of theory of 
mind has been questioned.18 Not all children with autism fail false belief tasks, and yet those 
who pass still have difficulty with social communication and interaction.19 There has also 
been an increasing move to recognize enhanced cognitive skills, for instance exceptional 
memory and attention to detail, in theoretical accounts. Accordingly, Baron-Cohen has 
reformulated his own theory as the ‘Empathising-Systemising Model.’20 This claims that 
autistic cognition combines skill in systemising, defined as an affinity for systematic, rule-
bound domains such as mathematics and engineering, with a deficit in empathising, broadly a 
reworked theory of mind construct. In one formulation or another, the notion of a theory of 
mind problem has prevailed with professionals in the autism field, albeit with many 
qualifications. 
There is no question that the children’s incorrect answer to the belief question in the 
Sally-Anne task suggests an important gap in their social imagination, which may help to 
explain the difficulties of both autistic children and autistic adults in social communication, 
as well as a marked literality in their understanding and use of language. But once again, 
close analysis of the video footage raises some additional questions. Firstly, the scenario is a 
piece of make-believe - a sort of puppet show, with Simon as the puppeteer, and Sally and 
Anne as the two puppets. Yet despite autistic children’s documented difficulties with pretend 
play, Andrew and Sara seem quite ready and able to engage with the pretence. Otherwise the 
question ‘Where will Sally look for her marble?’ would make no sense at all. Of course, it 
might be argued that it is precisely because the children’s understanding of pretence, 
necessary only to process the belief question, is compromised, that they cannot answer this 
question correctly. But in replications of the experiment, with real people rather than dolls 
carrying out the actions, autistic children still answer the belief question incorrectly. In the 
present version of the task, the children’s ability to attribute human agency to the dolls is 
side-lined in the interests of the theory of mind headline story.  
The experimenter’s script for the task includes not only describing the actions of the 
make-believe characters, but also feedback to the children. In keeping with the experimental 
protocol, to avoid biasing the results or ‘giving the game away’, Simon simply says ‘good’ or 
‘well done’ to each participant after each stage of the task. So Andrew and Sara receive the 
same positive feedback on their incorrect response as on their correct response. The merit of 
this approach is that the children are not upset by being told that they have failed. Autistic 
children can be especially sensitive to failure. Yet a kind word pointing out the correct 
response might have opened up a fruitful opportunity to ask the children why they thought 
that Sally would look ‘where the marble is now’ rather than where she had left it. Moreover, 
the script requirement for the children to receive inaccurate feedback poses an ethical 
dilemma, since it deprives the children of an opportunity to learn from their mistakes.  
Curiously, when giving feedback on the belief question Simon’s tone seems just fractionally 
more positive and encouraging when addressing Gabriel. Undoubtedly a departure from the 
experimental script and most probably completely unconscious - human nature and 
experimental rigour vying for the territory.  
 
Scene Two: Fawcett Primary School, Trumpington, Cambridge 2001 
For this second teaching video, entitled Just Imagine,21 imagination has had free rein. The 
skulls of different hominid species are filmed in the Cambridge Museum of Archaeology and 
Anthropology, then juxtaposed with palaeolithic tools and cave art to illustrate human 
imagination evolving across the millennia. Children are filmed playing make-believe in a 
school playground. A gifted young pianist, Javier Negrín, is filmed at the Royal Academy of 
Music collaborating with neuroscientists trialling neurofeedback to enhance emotional and 
expressive engagement in performance. The artist Issam Kourbaj describes how images of his 
Syrian childhood have inspired his sculptures made with found objects, and the neuroscientist 
and theatre director Daniel Nettle improvises with young performance arts students, also 
considering possible links between artistic temperament and mental disorder.  
Now we are recreating experimental tasks testing the hypothesis that autistic cognition lacks 
such striking expressions of creativity. Fawcett Primary School is not a specialist autism 
school, but has a policy inclusive of children with special needs. The experimenter is Jamie 
Craig, whose PhD, supervised by Baron-Cohen, focused on evaluating creative imagination 
in autism. His published studies are among the few in the literature on this theme.22 Our 
participants include an autistic pupil aged about eight, and younger neurotypical pupils as 
controls. Jamie explains that, unlike theory of mind and pretend play, which involve social 
imagination, the tasks we are filming test ‘individual creativity’ - what a child can imagine 
when not required to attribute intentions or take another person’s point of view. As will 
emerge, however, this social vs. individual distinction is blurred. A child’s reading of the 
social context and implications of the task may influence the creativity that is expressed.   
The key task here is an adaptation of the Alternate Uses Creativity test,23 in which 
participants are asked to generate as many as possible uses for an object such as a brick. Their 
creativity or ‘divergent intelligence’ is scored in terms of the number and originality of uses 
they suggest. For instance, using the brick as a door-stop might score less than incorporating 
it into a robot sculpture. In the adapted version, the child is shown a piece of white foam, 
triangular narrowing into a long thin strip. Jamie first asks the autistic child ‘What could this 
shape be? What does it look like?’ The boy looks bored and uninterested, but he tugs at the 
foam and says ‘glass’, evidently seeing the triangle and its thin extension as the bowl and 
stem of a wineglass. ‘Good response’ says Jamie, and prompts the child for another 
suggestion. When he holds the foam upright with the triangle at the bottom, the boy says 
‘foot’ and enacts the foot walking across the table. After that he runs out of ideas. Next Jamie 
presents the task to a neurotypical participant, a girl of about six. Her eyes light up and she 
smiles with pleasure. She turns the foam this way and that, modelling and describing her 
suggestions: extended, the foam is a snake, placed encircling her head, it is a hat, folded over 
it becomes a measuring rule, then a circle, a leaf and stem, a shoe and leg. Like Simon, Jamie 
keeps to the experimenter script, politely praising and recording each child’s responses. But, 
especially with the autistic child, he sounds uncomfortable, as if he would like to give more 
encouragement or cues. And of course his feedback phrase ‘well done’ is ambiguous. 
The autistic child’s responses are undoubtedly limited in number and originality compared to 
the neurotypical child’s, a consistent finding in Craig’s studies. But in some ways this 
difference is less interesting than the children’s strikingly contrasting approaches to the task, 
apparent only thanks to the recording. The little girl engages enthusiastically: each idea is 
enacted with flair and flows seamlessly into the next. Notwithstanding Jamie’s view that the 
task evokes individual creativity, social imagination infuses her responses. She has read the 
intention of the experimenter’s instructions as an invitation to perform, and acts her part with 
the experimenter as her audience. Her creativity lies not just in the number and quality of her 
ideas, but in the richness - not scored - of the enactment. By contrast there is little social 
engagement and limited enactment in the autistic child’s responses.  
My question, again, is whether a differently framed task might have offered learning 
opportunities, albeit compromising the experimental aim of showing autistic children’s 
limitations. For instance, many autistic people have areas of special interest, sometimes 
unusual in topic, and pursued with high levels of commitment and motivation.24 If autistic 
children do not spontaneously see the alternate uses task as fun, perhaps imagination tests 
harnessing their special interests would evoke more enthusiastic engagement.25 Koegel and 
Porter both report such benefits in interventions, for instance an autistic boy was encouraged 
to pretend through scenarios involving his interest in trains.26 Notably, although not a fully-
fledged performance, the boy in our video did enact a brief pretence, walking the imaginary 
foot across an imaginary floor. Thus another way to nurture such embryonic creativity might 
be through engagement with drama and fantasy, an effect demonstrated in the Imagining 
Autism project.27 
Since Craig’s intention was scientific hypothesis testing, these suggestions for 
practical interventions might seem misdirected. Yet the footage has also highlighted the 
theoretical question of whether Craig’s findings suggest a fundamental creativity block or just 
low creative motivation. 
 
Scene Three: Queensmill School, London 2009 
Queensmill is a state-funded primary and secondary ‘special school’ for autistic children, 
with an exceptional track record. Working with an Italian freelance film-maker, I have 
permission to video regular activities throughout the school, as well as to recreate 
experimental tasks. Video clips will be used in my new OU course ‘Understanding the 
Autism Spectrum’ combining online and hard copy teaching resources.28 Much as at Sybil 
Elgar, we film children at play, in classes and at lunchtime. New though, are the trampolines 
and gym equipped for sensory-motor stimulation. For years parents and schools had no doubt 
that heightened or lowered sensitivity to sensory stimuli affected how their children 
responded to the world. Yet only in 2013 was this symptom cluster included in the diagnostic 
criteria.   
We are provided with a small room to film pupils participating in brief illustrations of 
cognitive tests for use in teaching. Clips for the new course will include another false belief 
task to complement the 1990 footage of Sally-Anne, together with some verbal and non-
verbal tests from the WISC-IV (Weschler Intelligence Scale for Children).29 As we have no 
experimenter, a Queensmill teachers agrees to play this role. She is instructed on the test 
procedures, and mostly sticks to the script, remaining neutral and avoiding giving the 
children hints. Yet with her encouragement and affection for the children, who are interacting 
with someone familiar, the atmosphere is palpably warmer.  
The false belief task involves a Pringles canister with a lid. The teacher shows the canister to 
our first participant, a boy of around eight, and asks him what is inside. He answers ‘crisps’. 
Then he is shown that the canister contains only an orange ‘Pentel’ pen, which drops out 
when the teacher opens and upturns the canister. The child picks it up and identifies it as a 
pen. Then the teacher encloses it in the canister again, and asks the child ‘If Mary saw this, 
what would she think is inside?’ (Mary is a teacher whom the child knows). The child’s 
response ‘a Pentel’ complies with the prediction: he does not understand that unless Mary has 
witnessed the scenario she will have a false belief about the contents of the canister. At this 
point it seems that the teacher has misheard his response ‘Pentel’ as ‘pencil’ and she 
continues to refer to pencils, not Pentels in her follow-up questions to him  
Procedurally our experimental demonstration is flawed by this pencil/Pentel confusion, but 
we cannot re-film it because the child now knows the denouement. Yet I am somehow 
comfortable with the unflustered way the boy keeps to his own ‘Pentel’ script. And when 
offered crisps as reward for his participation, in a disarmingly sweet gesture, he pushes them 
back to the teacher saying ‘you have them’. Despite theory of mind difficulty according to the 
test, he is socially both graceful and generous. 
From the other tests filmed at Queensmill, I will describe one further example of how 
rigorous procedure may constrain interpretation. This is the block design task, a non-verbal 
sub-test from the WISC-IV 30 The teacher sits opposite the boy participant. She makes 
geometrical designs using square blocks with surfaces either all red, all white or diagonally 
split red and white, and invites the child to copy the designs with more blocks.  
 
 
On one ‘trial’ the teacher has formed the upward facing designs of four blocks into a red 
square with a superimposed white diamond. The child goes to great lengths to positions his 
blocks correctly, turning them over so that he has the right designs facing upwards. Working 
carefully and deftly, with a frown of concentration, he produces a perfect copy of the 
teacher’s block design, except that the colours are transposed – red diamond on white square. 
The teacher asks him if the two designs are the same and he says ‘yes’ without hesitation. 
According to WISC scoring this would be an error, and yet it is an appropriate and even, one 
might say, creative variation of the test design, only apparent thanks to the video. Moreover, 
it suggests that the child is attending to the overall pattern, not its details, in contrast to the 
common claim that autistic children fixate on details.  
Without praising this ‘incorrect’ response, the teacher moved to the next trial. A 
question to the child, not part of the protocol, might have shed interesting light on his 
thinking. 
 
Images of autism through interview and art 2018 
This year I am replacing our ‘Understanding the Autism Spectrum’ course, studied over nine 
years by more than 7000 students, with a new short online course.31 Developments in the 
autism landscape, already ongoing in 2009, mean that conveying autism adequately is ever 
more challenging. The course will describe developments in autism science and therapeutic 
intervention, services for autistic people and so on. But I also need to convey to students the 
growing demand for pluralism and inclusivity in methods for understanding autism.32 As 
shown in scenes one to three, the visual medium highlights nuances of behaviour and 
questions of interpretation which experimental tasks are not designed to address. One route to 
a richer analysis is more video-based observational research, and this has indeed become 
more common. For instance, Maestro and colleagues’ studies of parents’ early home videos 
of their infants highlighted subtle but important differences in the focus of attention between 
infants subsequently diagnosed with autism and neurotypical control infants.33 As for my 
teaching videos, these home recordings yielded unforeseen insights.  
The episodes in scenes one to three also begged the question of what the participants 
themselves thought. Since it is commonplace, in 2018, for people with autism to speak for 
themselves, it is important for autism, as portrayed in the new course, to be informed ‘from 
the inside’ by autistic people’s perspectives and experiences. Even less verbal children may 
express themselves powerfully through non-verbal means, their parents adding 
complementary insights derived from long-term knowledge and close bonds with their 
offspring.  
So in 2018 I am enriching the course with video recorded in the previous eighteen 
months, together with visual art to convey a sense of individual lives. One such encounter is 
with a young autistic man, and the other with an exceptionally gifted autistic child and her 
parents. In brief selections from this material I now return to the themes of self, inner life and 
imagination. 
Scene four: Walton Hall, The Open University, 2017 
Alex has driven himself and his mentor from Surrey to our interview recording in Milton 
Keynes. There is a quiet composure about him, and he engages well with the interview34, 
never appearing unwilling to answer my questions. He recounts that he has always excelled at 
science and maths, and is putting these skills to good use, studying pharmacy at university, 
while working part-time at a book-makers. He loves calculating betting odds and his flair for 
mathematics and computing is clearly well used. He tells us about his family, friendships and 
plans for the future. 
There is so much that could be the story of a neurotypical boy growing up. But Alex 
also talks of being isolated and friendless at school, of his social difficulties and obsessions 
and of how he overcame quite extreme bullying.  
I don’t ask Alex whether he has participated in tests of theory of mind, empathy, 
systemising or creativity. His own self-insights offer a rich and nuanced picture that test 
scores might do little to enhance. Regarding social imagination, he talks of his difficulties in 
imagining other people’s thoughts and feelings. Yet he recounts episodes of helping his 
friends which speak of empathic generosity. He also states that he dislikes fiction because he 
does not understand the characters’ intentions and cannot follow plots. Yet he has a strong 
sense of autobiography, self and identity, of which his autism is an integral part. Here, then, 
are expressions of a rich inner life, even if Alex’s imagination is fired by scientific formulae 
and mathematical equations, not by fiction and fantasy.  
Scene five: Northamptonshire, August 2016 
 I am with a producer and cameraman at the house of Iris Grace, aged seven, and her parents, 
Arabella and P. J. Iris Grace has few words, and for part of our visit she is out of the house 
with her father. In my interview with Arabella she talks at length about the early realisation 
that Iris was developing differently.35 She would not settle at night, was so hyper-sensitive to 
textures that she was difficult to clothe and her language development was slow and limited. 
Arabella describes the difficult experience of Iris Grace’s diagnosis, aged two, and the 
approach that she and P. J. evolved to provide security, stimulation and learning for her.  
Arabella made mugs of watery paint to encourage Iris Grace to express herself and 
communicate, for instance by choosing colours and asking for more paint. By the age of 
three, Iris Grace displayed unique and special gifts, the evidence of which is all around us as 
we talk. She mixes her own paint colours and often drops or flicks the paint onto paper from 
above, with a technique almost like Jackson Pollock’s. She selects small and large brushes or 
rollers and sponges to achieve different effects: 
https://irisgracepainting.com/paintings/ 
  
The exceptional quality of Iris Grace’s artwork, which is sold all over the world, evokes so-
called ‘savant talent’, defined as an exceptional talent in the context of profound 
disabilities.36 Savant autistic art is often described as the product of exceptional memory and 
meticulous attention to detail reflected in accurate representation of real scenes. This 
proposal, attributing autistic art to quirks of neuropsychological functioning,37 conveniently 
avoids reconciling evidence of creativity with a diagnostic profile that has imagination deficit 
as a criterion. Although some autistic artwork does involve memory and replication, many 
examples transcend a single reducible genre. Iris Grace’s unusual brushwork bears 
comparison to abstract expressionism and her paintings have qualities of colour, light and 
spontaneity reminiscent of impressionism. Yet her work is no pastiche: each painting has its 
own strongly coherent abstract patterning, a variation on a unified and distinctive style.  
Iris Grace might be unable to participate in theory of mind or creativity tests. Yet it is surely 
plausible to see her work as the expression of a rich inner imagination. 
Conclusions 
The earlier scenes in my archive of video teaching material induced me to articulate a certain 
ambivalence about classic scientific approaches to ‘understanding’ autism. I am a cognitive 
psychologist by training. I appreciate the role of experimentation and other quantitative work 
in researching autism, and have employed these methods in my own work. Scientific 
methodology plays the important role of identifying behaviours and traits which autistic 
people tend to share in common, and of testing explanations against evidence. Rigorous 
testing is necessary, above all, in trials of new therapeutic interventions. Yet, as I have 
shown, experimental tasks constrain what questions are asked, and what evidence is 
considered relevant to the answers. The phenomena of interest are defined by the task, and 
the researcher’s stance. Further information is lost when reports of these studies are 
published. Traces of the original observations are typically confined to words, numerical data 
and the odd figure, and individual participant behaviour is not reflected in the mean scores 
and statistical analyses which constitute the data. By contrast, video preserves traces which 
give access to richer fields of enquiry.  
With some exceptions, for instance spatial ability tests, on which autistic people 
perform especially well, experimental tasks have predominantly focused on evaluating 
deficits. Even Baron-Cohen’s systemising quotient, which measures enhanced affinity for 
fields governed by systems and rules, seems, paradoxically, to imply limitation. At several 
points in scenes one to three, instances of skilful or imaginative responding fell outside what 
the test was measuring. More interactive engagement with the participants might have evoked 
insights which the experimental protocol precluded. No wonder that Pellicano has advocated 
an integrated role for autistic people in both formulating research questions and interpreting 
evidence.Error! Bookmark not defined.  
In my teaching approach for 2018, I feature individuals with scientific and artistic 
talents as one of several routes to a richer appraisal of autistic capabilities. Of course, most 
individuals on the autism spectrum do not have the exceptional flair portrayed here, so in my 
teaching I am also careful to offer widely contrasting life stories. Yet demonstrating that rich 
inner imagination is possible in autism opens the dialogue about how it might be nurtured. 
One promising approach unfolds weekly at the house of Iris Grace herself. At the ‘Little 
Explorer’s Club’, Iris Grace is joined by other children for activities designed to both harness 
and stimulate their imagination. Group leaders build learning around children’s special 
interests and skills and through playful exploration of the environment. 
The ‘method’ of understanding autism through personal stories is entirely contrary to 
the careful control and statistical analysis of experiments and other psychological tests. Part 
of the power of experimental studies lies in minimising individual differences in order to 
convey a representative picture. Individual stories cannot be representative of all autistic 
experience, but they are authentic and informative in a different way. Notably they emphasize 
the wide spectrum of variation which autism encompasses. They also empower individuals to 
speak, and enable expressions of creativity to be recognized and celebrated.  
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